Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Bodell Construction Company, Inc. v. David I.
McOmber, Rachael B. McOmber, Steven M.
Snelson and David I. McOmber and Rachael B.
McOmber, Turstees of the David I. McOmber
Family Trust : Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Keith W. Meade; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal.
J. Rand Hirschi; Dunn & Dunn; B. Ray Zoll.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Bodell Construction v. McOmber, No. 900338.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3124

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF

K

J

DOCKET NO.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC. ,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

vs.
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHAEL B.
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON
and DAVID I. McOMBER and
RACHAEL B. McOMBER, Trustees
of the David I. McOmber
Family Trust,

Supreme Court Docket No. (\ /0/PP
Utah Ct. of Appeals 900338-CA

Defendants/Appellees.
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM A DECISION AND JUDGMENT
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Petitioner
B. Ray Zoll
Attorney for McOmbers
5300 South 360 West, #360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
J. Rand Hirschi
Attorney for Snelson
Dunn & Dunn
230 South 500 East #460
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

FILED
'APR 1 8 1501
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC. ,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

vs.
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHAEL B.
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON
and DAVID I. McOMBER and
RACHAEL B. McOMBER, Trustees
of the David I. McOmber
Family Trust,

Docket No.

Defendants/Appellees.
Bodell Construction Company petitions this Court for a
writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals issued in this matter on March 20, 1991, a copy of which is
attached hereto in Appendix "A".
£A£XL££
The parties to this action are all identified in the
caption.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

Parties

1

Table of Contents

1

Table of Authorities

2

Questions Presented for Review

3

Official Report of the Utah Court of Appeals

4

Jurisdiction

5

Controlling Statutes

5

Statement of the Case

6

Argument

11

Conclusion

18

Appendix

20
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978)

14,17

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P. 2d 634
(Utah 1989)

4

Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982)
Judkins v. Toone. 492 P. 2d 980 (Utah 1980)
Sandbera v. Klein. 572 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978)

16
12
12,16,17

Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 941
(Utah A. 1989)

12,15

U. C. A. §25-5-1

4,5,14,16

U. C. A. §57-1-27, et. seq

4,5,15

Rule 56, U. R. C. P

5

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, §185

14

2 A. C. J. S. Agency. §146

13

- 2 -

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court error in concluding that there

were no issues of material fact and that summary judgment was
available against Bodell with respect to the following where:
a.

Associated

Title

(the trustee)

and

Bodell

(the

beneficiary) said Associated had no express authority to
bid and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that
Associated

Title had actual authority to bid at the

trustee' s sale for Bodell;
b.

Bodell never gave bid instructions to anyone and the

trial court concluded as a matter of law that the trustee
had actual authority to bid;
c.

Bodell never spoke to the trustor about Associated

Title, and the trial court concluded as a matter of law
that the trustee had apparent authority to bid;
d.

Bodell refused the trustee's deed and the trustor

continued to live in the property after the sale, and the
trial court concluded as a matter of law that Bodell
ratified the unauthorized bid;
e.

Bodell never knew that bidding instructions were

required or that the loan broker had given a loan payoff
to Associated, and the trial court concluded as a matter
of law that Associated' s bid was a unilateral error by
Bodell.
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2.

Is a foreclosing trustee who bids at a foreclosure

sale on behalf of a beneficiary, without express authorization to
do so, automatically cloaked with implied or apparent authority to
bid by virtue of the trust deed foreclosure statutes?
3.

Does a trustee's sale under Utah law, U. C. A. §57-1-

1, £i seq. , fall within the statute of frauds, U. C. A. §25-5-1, such
that the authority of a trustee to bid and purchase at the sale on
behalf of a beneficiary must be given in writing?
4.

Does a trustee' s sale under Utah law fall within the

statute of frauds such that any ratification of a trustee' s bid at
the sale must be in writing?
Because the trial court granted summary judgment against
Bodell, this court should construe the facts presented in these
post-summary judgment proceedings in the light most favorable to
Bodell.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah

1989).

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was
issued on March 20, 1991.

The decision was issued on that court' s

Rule 31 calendar, and is not published.

JURISDICTION
A.

The Utah Court of Appeals decision was issued March

B.

No order respecting rehearing or an extension of

20, 1991.

time to petition for certiorari has been made and none has been
requested.
- 4 -

C.

This petition for a writ of certiorari is filed

within thirty (30) days after entry of the decision by the Utah
Court of Appeals, and is timely under Rule 48, U. R. A. P.
D.

This court has jurisdiction to review the decision

in this matter pursuant to the provisions of U. C. A. §§78-2-2(3)(a)
and 78-2-2(5).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
The following rules and statutes are, in substantial
part, determinative of the issues on appeal.
Rule 56, U. R. C. P. ... The [summary] judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
U. C. A. §25-5-1.
No estate or interest in real
property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering- or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.
U. C. A. §57-1-27(1).
On the date and at the time
and place designated in the Notice of Sale, the
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell
the property at public auction to the highest
bidder.
The trustee, or the attorney for the
trustee, may conduct the sale and act as the
auctioneer.
The trustor, or his successor in
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the
order in which the trust property shall be sold, if
the property consists of several known lots or
parcels which can be sold to advantage separately.
The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall
- 5 -

follow these directions. Any person, including the
beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

History of the Case.

This action is one to determine the invalidity of a
trustee's sale.

Competing motions for summary judgment were filed

in the Fourth District Court.

(R. 190.221. ) Summary judgment was

entered in favor of the defendants by Judge Ballif of the Fourth
District Court in May, 1987.

(R. 268). That decision was appealed

to the Supreme Court and later dismissed because of the lack of a
Rule 54(b) order.
to augment

(R. 462.)

the record

The trial court allowed the parties

and affirmed its prior

summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

ruling

(R. 568)

granting
The trial

court included in its Order a Rule 54(b) determination of finality.
This case was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of
Appeals

on June 2 5, 1990.

The Court of Appeals

affirmed the

District Court' s decision.

&
1.

Relevant Facts.
In

November,

1983,

Bodell

Construction

loaned

Snelson and McOmbers $200,000. 00 pursuant to a note secured by a
trust deed on McOmbers' residence.
2.

(McOmber Answer, 11 3, R. 11)

No payments were ever made on the note.

(McOmber

deposition, R. 287, p. 22)
3.

On January 9, 1984, Bodell asked Roger Terry of

Landmark Mortgage, the loan broker that was used by Snelson and

- 6 -

McOmber, to have someone begin foreclosure-

Terry asked for and

was given by Bodell the following letter to "get the ball rolling:"
Gentlemen,
Please accept this letter as authorization to
immediately begin foreclosure against the property
associated with this loan.
We grant you and the title company of your
choice full and complete authority regarding this
foreclosure action.
Please inform
information.

me

if

you

require

further

Very truly yours,
s/ Michael J. Bodell
(Bodell's deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 26; the letter is Exhibit 6
to Terry' s deposition dated 12/22/88. )
4.

Terry told Bodell that he needed the January 9

letter for "authorization to deliver papers to a trustee to start
the foreclosure.If
as the substitute

Terry ultimately asked Associated Title to act
trustee and start the

foreclosure.

(Terry

deposition dated 12/22/88, p. 34-39.)
5.

There is no evidence that either Snelson or McOmber

ever saw Bodell's letter of January 9, 1984.
to Associated Title before the sale.

McOmber never spoke

(McOmber deposition, R. 287,

p. 23. )
6.
time.

Snelson never had any contact with Bodell at any

(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 25-26. )
7.

Both Roger Terry (Landmark) and Blake Heiner (of

Associated Title, the substitute trustee) stated that they never
- 7 -

understood

that

the

January

9 letter

gave

them

determine the bid for Bodell at the trustee' s sale.
Blake Heiner and Roger Terry, R.

authority

to

(Affidavits of

214, 211, copies attached as

Exhibits 1 and 2.)
8.

Blake Heiner testified with regard to the January 9,

1984 letter that:
a.
He never discussed it with Bodell or Terry
(Heiner deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 21); and,
b.
that Associated Title would not have relied on
the letter as giving it authority to determine the
bid at the sale and that they did not do so in this
case.
(Heiner deposition, 2/8/89, p. 22, 1. 1-4,
6-9. )
9.

Roger

Terry

testified

that

he

would

be

very

surprised if Bodell took the position that Terry was handling the
foreclosure sale for him.

"I wasn't handling anything for him.

The only thing that I did for him was to start the foreclosure. "
(Terry deposition, 12/22/88, p. 126. )
10.

Roger Terry of Landmark testified that his wife was

contacted by Associated Title shortly before the sale and asked to
give

a

payoff

amount.

Mr.

Terry

testified

that

he

called

Associated back with the loan payoff amount as requested.

Terry

understood that this amount was needed in case Snelson or McOmber
wanted to pay

the loan off prior to the sale.

Terry

never

understood that he was being requested to give a bid amount for the
sale.

Terry knew at the time he called Associated and left a

message giving the payoff amount that Bodell wanted to obtain a
deficiency.

(Terry deposition, p. 56, 57, 66, and Exhibit 5A. )
- 8 -

11.

Blake Heiner testified that he could not recall

discussing with Terry any request for a bid amount in connection
with

this

sale.

Heiner

agreed

in

his

deposition

that

any

conversation likely could have been in the form of a message left
with Terry' s wife.

When Mr. Heiner went to the sale, the only

information that he had from Mr. Terry was in the form of a
telephone message which stated, in full, that the "payoff on sale
tomorrow ($243,127.15) plus foreclosure costs."
message is at R. 205. )
12.

(The telephone

(Heiner deposition, pp. 11, 12, 44, 45. )

No one other than Blake Heiner of Associated Title

attended the August 31, 1984 trustee' s sale.

(Heiner affidavit, 11

5, R. 211. )
13.

The "Bid" referred to in the trustee's deed, dated

September 11, 1984 was made by Blake Heiner at the sale on August
31, 1984 and was based upon the telephone message he received from
Terry which gave the "payoff" amount.

(Heiner affidavit, 1F6, R.

211, 212. ) No written authority was ever requested of or given by
Bodell to Associated Title to (i) bid on its behalf at the sale
(ii) or to enter any bid for any specific amount.
14.

There was no evidence that Snelson or McOmber ever

discussed with Bodell, Associated Title or Terry at any time the
amount to be bid at the sale.

There was no evidence that Snelson

or McOmber were ever aware of what amount was to be bid or was in
fact bid at the sale.
first sale.

Neither Snelson nor McOmber attended the

McOmber continued to reside in the home even after the

- 9 -

first

sale.

(McOmber deposition,

R.

287, p.

22, 23; Heiner

deposition, p. 19; Bodell deposition, p. 91. )
15.

On or about October 3, 1984, and within a few days

of when it first saw the "trustee's" deed, Bodell sought legal
advice about how it could collect the balance due on its note.
Prior to that date, neither Associated nor Landmark had explained
to Bodell the role the amount bid at sale played in obtaining a
deficiency.

On October 3, 1984, Bodell learned for the first time

that Associated' s unauthorized bid could affect Bode_
obtain a deficiency.

s right to

(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 1 >, 114, 84,

82; Bodell affidavit, 116, 8, 9, R. 501-503. )
16.

Bodell immediately contacted Associated Title and

McOmber, and advised them that the bid had not been authorized.
(R. 501-503; Bodell deposition, p. 113, 114, 84, 82. )
17.

Associated Title accepted and recorded a quit claim

deed back from Bodell which stated in part that "this deed is given
to reconvey a trustee's deed which was recorded September 11, 1984
which

was

erroneously

given

to

Bodell

Construction

Company. "

Associated recorded this deed, published a new notice of sale, and
reconducted the sale on the 19th day of November, 1984.

(R. 202,

207. )
18.

At no time did Bodell ever authorize or ratify, in

writing, the alleged sale or the "bid" entered by Associated Title
at the sale.
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19.

The property was resold on November 19, 1984.

At

this sale, a bid of $170,000.00 was made at the direction of
Bodell.

(R. 240. )

ARGUMENT
I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE
This

case was decided

affirmed without opinion.

on summary judgment.

It was

The trial court concluded as a matter of

law that "Associated Title had actual and apparent authority to
conduct

the

Trustee's

sale,

and

ratified the Trustee7 s sale. . . "
reached

as

a matter

of

that

the

plaintiff

(R. 573. )

law in spite

of

[Bodell]

This conclusion was

the

following

facts

supporting exactly the opposite result:
a.

the trustee and loan broker each acknowledged

that neither had authority to determine a bid for
Bodell at the sale; (R. 211-214.)
b.

it was undisputed that Bodell had never been

consulted regarding bidding at the sale; (R. 500503. )
c.

Bodell never gave any bidding instructions for

the sale to anyone; (R. 500-503, Bodell deposition,
February 8, 1989, p. 36, 38, 64-69, 72, 114. )
d.

Bodell never spoke to the trustor

about Associated

Title;

287, p. 22, 23. )
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(McOmber)

(McOmber deposition, R.

e.

when Bodell first saw the trustee' s deed it

delivered to the trustee a quit-claim deed, which
the trustee accepted and recorded, "to reconvey a
trustee' s deed- . .which was erroneously given. " (R.
207, 202)
Because summary judgment was granted against Bodell, it
is entitled to a review with all facts, and inferences to be drawn
from those facts, considered in the light most favorable to it.
Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 941 (Utah A. 1989).

In a

summary judgment proceeding, the trial court is not to weigh the
evidence and its credibility.

Even if the facts are undisputed,

they must be such that conflicting inferences cannot be drawn from
them.

Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978).

The evidence

must preclude any reasonable probability that Bodell could prevail
at trial.

Judkins v. Toone, 492 P. 2d 980 (Utah 1980).
How can there be a finding by the trial court of a grant

of actual authority where the trustee acknowledges there is none?
How can there be a finding by the trial court, as a matter of law,
of apparent authority when there has been no contact between the
principle (Bodell) and the third person (McOmber) regarding the
trustee, other than the statutory notices?

How can there be a

finding, as a matter of law, by the trial court of ratification
when the trustee's deed is refused and a deed "to reconvey a
trustee' s deed. . . which was erroneously given. . . " is delivered to
the trustee and recorded by the trustee within days of the time the
beneficiary first sees the trustee' s deed?
- 12 -

It is hornbook law that an agent' s authority is "composed
of his [1] actual authority, express or implied, together with the
[2] apparent or ostensible authority which the principal by his
conduct precludes himself from denying.
Because the statements

2 A. C. J. S. Agency, §146.

by both Associated

Title

and

Landmark created, at a minimum, a factual dispute regarding express
authority, it must be presumed that summary judgment was based upon
implied or apparent authority.

In the circumstances of this case,

implied or apparent authority in Associated Title to bid for Bodell
at the August trustee' s sale can flow only from the fact that
Associated Title was a trustee, the only entity authorized by Utah
statute to foreclose the trust deed.

The trial court' s summary

judgment had to be based upon its conclusion that a statutory
trustee under a trustee' s deed has plenary power to determine and
enter a bid on behalf of a beneficiary at a foreclosure sale simply
by virtue of its status as a trustee.
This conclusion ignores fundamental principles of law and
prior related decisions of this Court.
It cannot be contended in this matter, in the face of the
affidavits of Associated Title and Landmark Mortgage, (R. 211,214)
that there was express authority given in writing even by the
January 9, 1989 letter, to Associated Title to determine and enter
a bid at the sale on behalf of Bodell Construction.
The only other writing potentially capable of conferring
authority to bid on Associated Title was the trust deed.

And there

was no language in the trust deed which authorizes the trustee to
- 13 -

determine or enter a bid on behalf of the beneficiary (or the
trustor) at the sale. Taken to its extreme, which is what occurred
in this case, the trial court has determined that a trustee can
appear at a sale in its capacity as a trustee, enter a bid without
direction, and that bid becomes binding upon either party to the
sale.
Such plenary power cannot exist for at least two reasons.
First, this court has previously recognized that trustees under
trust deeds owe both the trustor and the beneficiary a fiduciary
duty to act fairly.

Bloda

t v.

artsch, 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1^8).

This dual obligation precludes

. finding of inherent or plenary

authority in a trustee to determine and enter a bid at the sale on
behalf of either party, absent express written authority from one
party or the other expressly authorizing the circumstances upon
which a bid may be entered on its behalf at the sale.
Second, the statute of frauds, U. C. A. §25-5-1, requires
that the authority to bid, which is a power over real property, be
granted in writing.

Stated simply, a trustee at a statutory

foreclosure sale should be required to have written instructions in
order to be able to bid at the sale for either a trustor or a
beneficiary.
continued.

Absent written instructions, the sale should be
A statutory trustee is not, and cannot be, an agent

with inherent authority to bid for either party at the sale.
For

the

same

reasons,

the

principles

authority have no application to a trustee' s sale.

of

apparent

In this case,

the evidence as that Bodell and McOmber did not talk about
- 14 -

Associated Title.

Apparent authority could have arisen only from

Associated Title conducting itself as a trustee.

A trustee is the

only person or entity authorized to conduct a trustee' s foreclosure
sale.

The

trust

deed

foreclosure

statutes,

recognize the right of a trustee to bid.

U.C. A.

§57-1-27

They do not, however,

confer a trustee with authority apparent or otherwise, to determine
and enter a bid for either party.
Any universal rule of plenary authority in a trustee to
determine a bid and enter it on behalf of either party would
destroy the dual fiduciary obligation of the trustee.
II.
BODELL DID NOT RATIFY THE AUGUST TRUSTEE'S SALE
Again, this matter was determined by summary judgment in
the District Court.

This court should review all facts in the

light most favorable to Bodell.

Seftel v. Capitol City Bank. 767

P. 2d 941 (Utah A. 1989).
In

order

for

ratification

elements must be satisfied:

to

occur,

(1) the principal's

the

following

knowledge of

material facts and (2) an intent by the principal to ratify.
Jur.

2d

Agency

§185.

Given

Bodell's

lack

of

3 Am.

understanding

regarding the trust deed process, and the fact that he refused the
trustee's deed and redelivered title (R. 202, 207), it cannot be
concluded, as a matter of law, that Bodell ratified anything.

At

a minimum, there are conflicting inferences to be drawn.
The trial court' s decision is also contrary to existing
case law regarding ratification.

Where the law requires that the
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authority to act in the first instance have been given in writing,
the ratification must also be in writing.

Bradshaw v. McBride. 64 9

P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982); 3 Am. Jur 2d, Agency §185, s£. seq.
The

purported

right of Associated

Title

to bid

and

purchase at the sale as an agent on behalf of Bodell Construction
is a power over real property.

U. C. A.

§25-5-1.

Because the

authority of Associated Title to determine a bid and purchase the
property at the foreclosure sale must be given in writing, any
ratification of a previously unauthorized bid by Bodell must also
be in writing.
1986).

Williams v. Singleton. 723 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah

Bradshaw v. McBride, supra.

In this case, there is no

writing by Bodell subsequent to the sale ratifying the sale.

The

first and only writing by Bodell to Associated Title subsequent to
the first sale was a quit claim deed back to Associated Title given
to ". . . reconvey a trustee' s deed. . . erroneously given. . . ".

(R. 202,

207. )
The trial court' s decision ignores the requirements of
Sandbera, supra, and Bradshaw, supra.
determine

This Court should expressly

or review that ratification of the bid also falls within

the statute of frauds and must be given in writing.
III.
THERE WAS NO UNILATERAL MISTAKE BY BODELL
The final basis upon which the trial court might have
based its decision was that Bodell Construction made a unilateral
mistake by failing to authorize any bid at the sale.
action, it cannot be said that Bodell Construction made
- 16 -

In this
r.y mistake

regarding the bid at the sale.
had to be bid at the sale.

Bodell did not know that any amount

(R. 501-503. ) Bodell did not know that

Associated Title had requested information from Landmark Mortgage,
even about a payoff amount.

Any mistake was that of Associated

Title.
If this Court were to determine that the authority of the
trustee to bid at a trustee' s sale on behalf of either the trustor
or the beneficiary must be conferred in writing, then Bodell has
made no mistake.
Even if it could be said that Bodell had made some error
in connection with the sale, the recent decision of this Court in
the case of Guardian State Bank v. Stancrel, 778 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1989)
recognizes the authority of the court to correct even a unilateral
error.
IV
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
The trial court has ignored the fundamental principle of
Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1976).

Many of the facts

support exactly the opposite conclusion reached by the trial court.
In addition, this case presents an opportunity for this Court to
address (i) the interface between Blodaett, supra, and any notions
of the implied and apparent authority of a trustee and (ii) the
interface between the trust deed foreclosure statutes
statute of frauds.

None of these matters

addressed by this court.

and the

have been squarely

There was, in this case, no authority

given to the trustee to determine and enter a bid for either party
- 17 -

at the sal-.

There was no authorized buyer at the sale.

Bodell

lost its right to obtain a deficiency without having ever been
consulted about the bid.
CONCLUSION
This Court, for the reasons set forth above, should grant
a Writ of Certiorari and after appropriate examination, vacate the
decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals and of the trial
court and remand the case for further decision.
Respectfully submitted this / fy^Siav

of April, 1991.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.

Keith W. Meide
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant,
Petitioner
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APPENDIX "A*

FILSD

1

•sierfc or :ns Court
"** Gewa <*t Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
•

00O00

Bodell Construction Company,
Inc. ,

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Plaintiff and Appellant,

David I. McOmber, Rachael B.
McOmber, Steven M. Snelson, and
David I. McOmber and Rachael B.
McOmber, Trustees of the David
I. McOmber Family Trust,

Case No. 900338-CA

Defendants and Appellees.

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Jackson (On Rule 31
Hearing).
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
31.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the trial court's ruling granting
summary judgment is affirmed.
Dated this 20th day of March, 1991.
ALfc CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

APPENDIX "B

- ^

FtliJ

J. RAND HIRSCHI, #1SC3
DUNN & DUNN
460 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-6666

r)£!ii^

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B.
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON
and DAVID B. McOMBER, TRUSTEES
of the DAVID I. McOMBER
FAMILY TRUST,
Defendants.

Civil No. 68297
Judge Ballif

This matter came on for hearing on defendant Snelson's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding. J. Rand Hirschi appeared for
defendant Snelson and Keith W. Meade appeared for plaintiff. Summary judgment had
been granted Snelson and the remaining defendants by a Judgment dated May 18, 1987,
which plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. That appeal was dismissed

pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it had not been certified as
a final order. By an Order dated May 9, 1989, this Court granted both parties leave to
augment the record with respect to the Summary Judgment. By agreement of the parties,
depositions from a related action in the Third Judicial District were submitted by defendant
Sneison, and plaintiff submitted additional affidavits. These submissions went to the
issues of whether Associated Title, which had conducted the Trustee's sale here in
question, had actual authority or apparent authority to conduct the sale and enter a bid, and
to the issue of whether plaintiff had ratified the Trustee's sale. A memorandum was filed
by defendant Sneison and by plaintiff, and the matter was argued and submitted.
The "Disputed Facts" set forth in plaintiff's December 8, 1989 Memorandum in
Opposition to Snelson's Motion for Summary Judgment do not contradict the facts relied
upon by defendant Sneison.
Both parties stated at the hearing that they knew of no reason to delay the entry of a
final judgment, should the court affirm the judgment.
Having considered the augmented record, and the memoranda and arguments of die
parties, and having heretofore entered its Ruling dated March 31, 1990, the Court
concludes that there remain no issues of material fact, that Associated Title had actual and
apparent authority to conduct the Trustee's sale and enter a bid, and that plaintiff ratified the
Trustee's sale, that a beneficiary cannot unilaterally abrogate a trustee's sale for his own
advantage on the grounds of his own unilateral mistake, and that the summary judgment
should be reaffirmed.
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The Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay in the
entry of this final judgment on the issues between plaintiff and defendants, and hereby
expressly directs the entry of final judgment.

Accordingly, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
That based on the augmented record, defendants* motion for summary judgment
be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiffs complaint against defendants and all
claims and causes of action that were or could have been asserted therein be, and hereby
are, dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, with costs to defendants.
DATED this ^»V day of < ^ o ^ ^ J ^

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

GEORGE E0ALUF
District Court Judge
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APPENDIX »C

Keith W. Meade (Bar No, 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL BODELL

Plaintiff,
vs
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B.
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON
and DAVID B. McOMBER,
TRUSTEES Of the DAVID I.
McOMBER FAMILY TRUST,

Civil No. 68297
Honorable George E. Ballif

Defendants.
*

STATE OF UTAH

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

)
:

SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Michael Bodell, upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I was

Construction

at

the

vice

president

all

times

material

of

the

hereto.

plaintiff,
I have

Bodell

personal

knowledge of the matters set forth hereinafter.
2.
Roger

Prior to the August 31, 1984 trustee's sale, I told
Terry

of

Landmark

that

Bodell

wanted

to

remain

in a

position to obtain a deficiency after the sale.
3.

Prior

to the August

31 sale,

I was

not aware that

Landmark had been asked to give or had given any dollar amount,
as a payoff or otherwise, to Associated Title.
4.

I did not know prior to August 31 that Associated Title

believed or had any reason to believe that it had been given any
authority to bid at the sale.
5.

Nobody from Associated Title ever spoke to me prior to

the August 31 sale.

No one from Associated Title ever contacted

me to inquire as to the extent of Landmark' s authority or about
the January 9, 1984 letter.
6.

If

Landmark

Bodell

Mortgage

Construction
or

Associated

had

been

Title

asked,

for

either

by

instructions

on

bidding, and if Bodell had understood or had explained to it by
anyone

the

relationship

between

the

bid

at

sale

and

the

availability of a deficiency, Bodell would never have authorized
or consented to a "pay off" bid.
7.

After the August 31 sale, a new listing agreement for

the property was signed with the same realtor that had had the
property listed for sale for the McOmbers.

The listing agreement

hard

sale

been

discussed

even

prior

to

the

and

it

was

my

understanding that as a result of the sale it had to be changed.
At all times subsequent to the first sale in August, the McOmbers
continued to live in the property and continued to try to sell
2

and market the property.

In October, the listing agreement was

changed back and McOmbers were the listing party.

They were

thrilled at this and continued to live in the house and try to
sell it-

The listing realtor even kept exceptions to the listing

agreement for McOmbers.

Some time in September, Bodell received

a $200.00 check, apparently from people living in the basement of
the property.

This payment was the only payment that Bodell ever

received

connection

in

with

the

property.

Bodell

never

understood that it was not entitled to accept this check.

The

trust deed, paragraph 10, gave Bodell the right to receive rents
upon default,
8.

At

no time

did

Bodell

ever

understand

that

it was

waiving or that it intended to waive any claim that i) the first
sale of the property was not authorized, or ii) that Associated
Title and Landmark Mortgage were not authorized to determine or
enter

a bid

voluntarily,

on behalf

of Bodell

at the sale.

intentionally or knowingly

Bodell

relinquished

never

any known

right in connection with its ability to obtain full payment under
the

trust

deed

note.

Bodell

never

intended

to

voluntarily

relinquish its right to obtain a deficiency against the trustors.
9.

Bodell never intended or expected or understood that

any of its conduct subsequent to the first sale constituted a
waiver, ratification or would result in an estoppel of Bodell to
obtain

full payment under the trust deed note.
3

Bodell never

understood or intended that any of its conduct subsequent to the
August 31 sale would serve to discharge or release any of the
parties

from liability for their unauthorized conduct.

Bodell

never understood that the unauthorized bid would hinder in any
way Bodell's ability to obtain full satisfaction under the trust
deed note.
10.

Bodell

-.id not see th- trustee's deed from the first

sale until very late in Septem: t or the first part of October.
The trustee's deed was receivea immediately prior to my meeting
with Richard Rappaport.
11.
to

I told Roger Terry prior to the sale that whatever was

happen

that

I wanted

to

keep

the

door

open to

obtain a

deficiency.
DATED this

[n

day of December, 1989.

WmJi-U

V :hael Bodell
Subscribed

and

sworn

to before

me

this

December, 1989.

'MtAu J.

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

SLC(
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UA-AZ-U

L.

day of

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT& SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 841H
Telephone: (801) 532-2666

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE HEINER

vs.

)

Civil No. 68297

DAVID McOMBER, et al.,

)

Judge Ballif

Defendants.

)

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
BLAKE HEINER, upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I am an officer of Associated title Company and have personal knowledge

of the matters set forth herein.
2.

I was the officer of Associated Title who conducted the sales of thp'

property described on Exhibit nA" attached, on August 31, 1984 and November 19, 1984.
3.

Prior to the August 31 sale, I had no communication with Michael Bodell or

anyone from Bodell Construction.
4.

Prior to the August 31 sale, I received a telephone message from Rogei

Terry of Landmark Mortgage, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "BtT. I did not speal
with Roger Terry regarding the message until after the August 31 sale.
5.

No one that I was aware of attended the sale of the property on August 31

1984 other than myself.

iii
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6.

The bid referred to in paragraph G of the Trustee's Deed recorded as Entr>

No 27110 was made by myself based upon the telephone message referred to in paragraph
4 above, that I received from Roger Terry.
7.

I was informed after the August 31 sale by Bodell Construction and Roger

Terry that the amount referred to in paragraph G of the Trustee's Deed was not intendec
to be a bid amount.
8.

I was never given, by Roger Terry, Landmark Mortgage, or anyone from

Bodell Construction Company, any authority to determine the amount that was to be bic
at the August 31 trustee's sale on behalf of Bodell Construction Company.
9.

The trustee's sale on November 19, 1984 was conducted at the request o)

Bodell Construction because they told me that my bid at the August 31, 1984 sale wa<
•lot authorized.
DATED this

day of February, 1987.

^TUV

Blake T. Heiner
Vice President
Associated Title Company

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the 4 t h day of February, 1986, b;
Blake T. Heiner, the signer of the foregoing ij

Nd^ffy-Public
Residing in S a l t Lake C i t y /
My Commission Expires:

December 17/

•2-

IV

Utah

1988
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.DATE.

FOR

E

J C T T I M ^ ^ /

M
TELEPHONED

^M--RETURNED

OF.
PHONE

> < % / - & & /

A^EACOOtr

YOUR CALL
EXTEJMS»Qf*

PLEASE CALL

MESLAGE

^Ipadhu
_7
SIGNED

WILL CALL AGAIN

jJI
^/

Mr./£?-^to~nn
JVSr/eST^'/plM

CAME
TO SEE YOU
WANTS
TO SEE YOU
TOPS

£

FORM <*Q03

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COUNE, RAPPAPORT <5c SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2CGG
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER TERRY

vs.

Civil No. 68297

DAVID McOMBl R, et al M

Judge Ballif

Dt fendants.
* * * * * * * *
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ROGET TERRY, upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I am an officer of Landmark Mortgage and have personal knowledge of the

matters set forth herein.
2.

I never discussed with Mike Bodell or anyone from Bodell Construction the

amount to be bid at the Trustee's sale conducted on August 31, 1984.
3.

At no time did I have authority from Mike Bodell or Bodell Construction to

determine the amount which would be bid at the Trusteed sale of the property which
occurred on August 3I f 1984.
4. Prior to the sale, Blake Ilciner of Associated Title contacted me and asked for
the payoff figure on the loan, 1 informed him of the payoff amount. I v/as not requested

to provide any bidc^ng . .structions wilh regard to the sale.
DATED t h i s ^ _ day of January, 1987.

/
•

Roger Terry

•

i • •

^--'

5TATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
BOUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the jw
>y j/y*/ K i * t

day of J/M/n/y./

, 1986,

, the signer of the foregoing instrument.
Notary Public /
.////
Residing in ,<[: Ct j £ j £

My Commission Exp res:'

-.

/J^r
fc"ti\
y

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Affidavit of Roger Terry was mailed, postage fully prepaid, this
1987, to the following:
B. Ray Zoll
Attorney at Law
5251 South Green Street, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Rand Hirschi
Attorney at Law
City Centre
400 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(Bodell-2)

2

day of January,

